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1. Introduction
During the last few years, there has been a substantial increase in the number of countries that have
adopted flexible exchange regimes. However, countries that are formally classified as having floating
exchange rate regimes (or very wide bands) show remarkable differences regarding the way in which
they manage exchange rate policy. They hold very different levels of international reserves, show
different propensities to intervene in the foreign exchange market, and allow very different degrees of
exchange rate flexibility in response to shocks.
Standard textbook discussions of exchange rate regimes emphasize that the main advantages of
flexibility derive from the ability to respond to shocks with an independent monetary policy.  These
discussions emphasize the role of monetary policy for output stabilization.  More recently, there has
been a growing consensus among economists and policymakers suggesting that countries that decide to
adopt a floating regime should use monetary policy to target inflation.  In particular, Svensson (1997)
has formally shown the optimality of inflation targeting implemented through a “Taylor rule” in which
interest rate adjustments depend on changes in inflation and output. However, Ball (1998) has shown
that, while inflation targeting and standard Taylor rules are appropriate for closed economies, this may
not be the case for open economies in which the pass-through from exchange rate to prices is high. In
particular, he shows that, because of its effect on prices, monetary authorities should also be concerned
about the exchange rate. While Ball emphasizes the role of exchange rate pass-through, recent work by
Aghion et al. (2000) and Bacchetta (2000) suggests an alternative reason to be concerned with the
exchange rate when conducting monetary policy: the presence of foreign currency debt in the balance
sheet of firms. They show that when firms hold a large fraction of their debt in foreign currency,
monetary policy becomes increasingly complex. This is due to the fact that, while reductions in interest
rate can have an expansionary effect through a credit channel, the depreciation brought about by the
interest rate reduction can be contractionary through a balance sheet channel.
In this paper, we document the main differences in exchange rate management among countries
that have formally adopted flexible exchange rate regimes.
1 We concentrate on three different aspects
of exchange rate management: the stock of reserves, the relative volatility of exchange rates vis a vis
reserves, and the relative volatility of exchange rates vis a vis interest rates. We then present a model
that explains these differences by emphasizing both the role of exchange rate pass-through (as in Ball,
1998) and the role of liabilities denominated in foreign currency (as in  Aghion  et al., 2000).  In
particular, we model the behavior of a Central Bank that attempts to minimize a standard Barro-Gordon
loss function in an environment where depreciations lead to inflation, and firms are credit-constrained
and have currency mismatches in their balance sheets. High levels of exchange rate pass-through may
lead the Central Bank to be more concerned about exchange rate movements. Similarly, the existence
of important currency mismatches in the economy may lead the Central Bank to limit exchange rate
volatility, as depreciations can hurt those exposed to foreign currency liabilities, and thus affect output.
After constructing measures of pass-through, as well as the ability of countries to avoid
currency mismatches in their balance sheets, we test the implications of the model. Using a sample of
30 countries with de facto floating exchange rate regimes or wide bands, we find a very strong and
robust relationship between a country’s pattern of floating and its ability to borrow internationally in its
own currency, which we use as an indicator of ability to avoid currency mismatches. More specifically,
countries that can borrow abroad in their own currency tend to keep a smaller stock of reserves, and
allow a higher volatility of exchange rates vis a vis reserves or interest rates. We find weaker and less
                                                       
1 Other papers which have highlighted differences across countries under similar exchange rate regimes include Levy
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999), Calvo and Reinhart (2000), and Edwards and Savastano (1999).6
robust evidence on the importance of exchange rate pass-through as a determinant of differences across
countries regarding their exchange rate management.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the differences in exchange rate
management among countries that formally have floating exchange rate regimes or wide bands. Section
3 briefly discusses the theoretical model, based on Aghion et al. (1999), which is derived formally in
the Appendix. The section then presents our main explanatory variables, the degree of exchange rate
pass-through and the ability of countries to borrow in their own currency, and empirically tests the
implications of the model. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. How Do Floaters Float?
In this section, we document important differences in the behavior of countries that formally have
floating exchange rate regimes or wide bands, regarding the management of the exchange rates. It is
important first to define the sample of countries that will be studied. For this paper, we worked with the
IMF classification of exchange rate regimes, using the November 1999 issue of the Fund’s
International Financial Statistics (IFS), which corresponds to regimes as of June 30, 1999. The
countries in our sample correspond to the following categories from the Exchange Arrangements
classification of the IMF:
i)  Independently floating: as of June 1999, there were 48 countries classified under this label.
More than half of these countries, however, are very small economies, mostly in Africa and the
Middle East. Since our interest is to look at the behavior of floaters in Latin America as
compared to developed and emerging market economies, we restrict the sample to exclude such
small countries.
2 The 17 countries from this group which we do include are the following:
Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United
States. To this group, we add Germany, which is classified as part of a monetary union (the
Euro Area) but which can be considered to be floating independently vis a vis the dollar.
ii)  Managed floating with no  preannounced path for exchange rate: For the same reasons as
above, out of 25 countries in this category, we include in our sample the following seven: the
Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Norway, Paraguay, and
Singapore.
iii)  Exchange rate with crawling or horizontal bands: From this group, we only include countries
in which the width of the band was at least 18 percent, in order to provide sufficient flexibility.
The five countries included under this last category are Colombia (crawling band of  "9
percent), Chile (crawling band of "16 percent), Greece (horizontal band of "15 percent), Israel
(crawling band of  "15 percent) and Poland (crawling band of  "12.5 percent). Of these
countries, Chile and Colombia have more recently adopted independently floating exchange
rate regimes.
                                                       
2 There are 30 countries that we exclude from the independently floating category. These are Afghanistan, Albania, Angola,
Armenia, Congo, Eritrea, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sao and Principe, Sierra Leona, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen Republic, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. We also excluded Ecuador, since it only adopted (briefly) a
floating regime in February 1999, in the context of a crisis, and has since moved on to dollarization.7
As a result, our sample includes 30 countries: the G-3 (the US, Germany and Japan); nine other
industrial countries (Australia, Canada, Greece, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom); nine Latin American and Caribbean countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru); and nine other developing
countries (the Czech Republic, Korea, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Poland, Singapore, South Africa
and Thailand). For some purposes, we will later divide the two last groups into emerging countries and
other developing countries.
In what follows, we describe how the different countries behave by focusing on three aspects of
their exchange rate management: i) the stock of reserves with which they float; ii) the extent to which
they use these reserves to stabilize the exchange rate; and iii) the extent to which they use interest rates
to stabilize the exchange rate.
2.1  The Stock of Reserves: Some Countries Float with Lifejacket
One of the dimensions in which floating countries differ very substantially is the level of reserves they
maintain. A country that floats without regard for the level of the exchange rate does not need a lot of
reserves to manage the exchange rate. In contrast, countries which for some reason are not willing to let
the exchange rate take any level need a large cushion of reserves to conduct exchange rate policy.
The first column of Table 1 presents the level of reserves in each of the countries in our sample,
normalized in each case by broad money (M2). The value of reserves corresponds to the average from
April 1998 through April 1999. The table shows very substantial differences across countries. Most
striking is the high level of reserves held by emerging country floaters as compared to industrialized
floaters. While countries such as Singapore, Peru and Chile have reserves that exceed 50 percent of
M2, most industrial countries keep a stock of reserves below 10 percent of M2. The differences in this
dimension are clearly illustrated at the bottom of Table 1. On average, emerging market floaters keep
reserves equivalent to 38 percent of M2, six times as much as do G-3 floaters, and more than twice as
much as other industrial countries.
3 The level of reserves in emerging countries is even higher than that
in non-emerging developing countries. In general, these results support  Calvo’s argument that
emerging countries seem to be floating “with lifejacket.” It is interesting to note that Argentina and
Uruguay, perhaps the two countries in Latin America that have the strongest commitment in terms of
their exchange rate, have levels of reserves below those of most of their floating counterparts in Latin
America.
4
                                                       
3 We define as emerging markets the following countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, South Korea,
Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, and Thailand.
4 Reserves/M2 are approximately 28 percent in the case of Argentina, and 20 percent in the case of Uruguay.8
Volatility of depreciation divided by volatility of: International reserves
over M2 International reserves Interest rate
Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank
AUSTRALIA 0.06 25 6.91 5 90.21 3
BRAZIL 0.25 14 2.92 8 12.13 24
CANADA 0.06 26 3.37 7 23.46 12
CHILE 0.49 3 0.42 25 7.96 27
COLOMBIA 0.41 5 0.93 19 8.48 26
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.31 8 1.26 16 13.97 20
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0.09 23 1.58 14 11.57 25
GERMANY 0.11 21 2.84 9 157.91 2
GREECE 0.36 6 0.39 28 25.02 9
GUATEMALA 0.30 9 0.42 26 24.94 10
INDIA 0.13 20 1.21 17 3.70 29
INDONESIA 0.34 7 2.15 13 23.38 13
ISRAEL 0.26 12 0.76 21 21.38 15
JAMAICA 0.25 15 0.27 30 2.75 30
JAPAN 0.05 28 30.45 1 377.26 1
KOREA SOUTH 0.24 16 1.35 15 14.14 19
MEXICO 0.30 10 0.84 20 6.99 28
NEW ZEALAND 0.06 27 12.68 4 23.78 11
NORWAY 0.29 11 0.36 29 12.34 23
PARAGUAY 0.26 13 0.62 23 12.38 22
PERU 0.64 2 0.51 24 13.13 21
PHILIPPINES 0.24 17 2.32 11 38.50 8
POLAND 0.45 4 0.42 27 14.58 18
SINGAPORE 0.88 1 0.69 22 20.00 16
SOUTH AFRICA 0.06 24 2.47 10 22.80 14
SWEDEN 0.14 19 0.98 18 62.59 5
SWITZERLAND 0.09 22 2.27 12 40.43 7
THAILAND 0.23 18 6.62 6 15.16 17
UNITED KINGDOM 0.02 29 17.95 3 46.54 6
UNITED STATES 0.01 30 19.38 2 69.63 4
Averages by country grouping
G3 0.06 17.55 201.60
OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED 0.15 5.07 38.42
EMERGING COUNTRIES 0.37 1.76 15.65
OTHER DEVELOPING 0.21 0.82 11.06
LAC EMERGING 0.42 1.12 9.74
EAST ASIA 0.39 2.63 22.23
ALL COUNTRIES 0.25 4.18 40.579
2.2  Stabilizing Exchange Rates with Reserves
To what extent do floaters attempt to stabilize exchange rates by intervening in the foreign exchange
market? In order to answer this question, we look at the relative volatilities of the exchange rate and of
reserves. We work with relative  volatilities, because comparisons based solely on the volatility of
exchange rates alone, or of reserves alone, could be misleading. Comparing exchange rate volatilities
does not provide a complete idea of the willingness of a country to defend its parity. The exchange rate
in a country could be more volatile than that in another simply because it is subject to larger external
shocks, even if the authorities intervene heavily to keep the exchange rate within certain limits.
Comparing volatility of reserves may be problematic as well. Reserves may be very stable during a
period due to the absence of shocks, even in a country that would intervene heavily if a shock warrants
it. A possible drawback of using relative  volatilities is that one does not know if the ratio is high
because the numerator is unusually high, or the denominator unusually low. For this reason, Table 1A
in the Appendix presents the volatility of reserves, and that of exchange rates country by country, as
well as the ranking of the countries in the sample according to each of these measures.
As a measure of exchange rate volatility, we use the standard deviation of the rate of
depreciation.
5 As a measure of the volatility of reserves, we use the standard deviation of the stock of
reserves, normalized by the dollar value of the stock of broad money (M2). In order to prevent changes
in the exchange rate from affecting the measured volatility of reserves through the dollar value of M2,
the monetary aggregate is averaged over the period under consideration. More precisely, the indicator
of the degree to which countries intervene in the foreign exchange markets using reserves is given by:
) 2 ( ) ( M RES std DEP std .
This indicator provides information about how flexible exchange rate regimes are in reality.
Under a truly fixed exchange rate regime or a crawling peg with a constant rate of crawl, the standard
deviation of devaluations would be zero. Therefore, our indicator would take a value of zero as well. In
a purely floating regime, in which there is no foreign exchange intervention at all, the denominator
would be 0, and our index would tend to infinity. The value of the index can give us a good indication
of the degree to which, independently of the formal classification, the regime is de facto floating or
not.
6
In calculating our foreign exchange intervention indicator, an important aspect is to define
which exchange rate should be used in the calculations for each country. While the exchange rate vis a
vis the US dollar is the natural one to use in most cases, there are some cases in which the exchange
rate vis a vis other currencies is more appropriate.  For the case of countries in Europe, we use the
exchange rate against the Mark as a basis for our calculations. In the case of New Zealand, we use the
Australian dollar, since the links to this currency are much stronger than those to the US dollar. In the
case of the United States, we used the nominal effective exchange rate as the basis for our indicators. In
all other cases, we used the exchange rate with respect to the US dollar.
7
The second column of Table 1 shows the results of our index of foreign exchange intervention.
For most countries, the values of the index correspond to the period January 1997-April 1999 (or up to
                                                       
5 We prefer this measure to the volatility of the exchange rate, since it is possible that the (implicit) objective of the
intervention is to achieve a crawling peg with a fairly constant rate of crawl, rather than simply to keep the exchange rate at
a certain level. We also worked with an alternative index of foreign exchange intervention, which considers the volatility of
changes in reserves rather than levels. The results are very similar, and are therefore not reported here.
6 Sturzenegger and Levi Yeyati (1999) use volatility of reserves and exchange rates in order to classify countries according
to their de facto regimes.
7 Data on exchange rates and on reserves was taken from IFS.10
the latest month available from IFS). In the case of countries which abandoned fixed or intermediate
exchange rate regimes after January 1997, we chose to start the period of measurement three months
after the regime shift, in order to exclude the initial period, so as to give the exchange rate enough time
to stabilize at a new level.
8
As with the stock of reserves, the differences among floating countries are striking. The relative
volatility of exchange rates vis a vis that of reserves is very large in Japan, the United States and the
UK, suggesting that these countries are very close to a pure float. Germany and Australia also show
high values for this index.  At the other end of the spectrum, we find a mix of countries that seem to
intervene substantially in the foreign exchange market, demonstrating behavior closer to that of fixed
regimes. Some of them are from Latin America (Chile, Guatemala, Peru and Paraguay), while others
are the countries of the European Union that have not joined the Euro (Greece, Norway, and Sweden),
which show a preference to keep their exchange rates vis a vis their neighbors very stable. Among the
East Asian floaters, Singapore is the one that seems to intervene the most. Interestingly, the set of
countries at the lower extreme of the index includes countries with wide bands (such as Greece and
Chile), countries under managed floating regimes (such as Guatemala, Norway, Paraguay and
Singapore) and countries that are labeled  independent floaters (Sweden and Peru).
At the bottom of Table 1 we show the index, averaged according to country groups. The index
for the emerging countries is one tenth that corresponding to the G-3, one half that of other developed
floaters, and twice the size of that in other developing countries. This clearly shows that the ability to
float freely is closely associated with the level of development. Among the emerging floaters, those in
East Asia seem to be closer to the ideal float, in comparison to the Latin American countries. However,
with the exception of Indonesia and Thailand, even these countries are very far from  de facto
independent floating.
2.3 Stabilizing Exchange Rates with Interest Rates
In the previous section we focused on one of the variables that monetary authorities can use to manage
exchange rates: reserves. But intervention in the foreign exchange market is not the only channel that
monetary authorities can use in order to influence movements in the exchange rate. They can also
affect it by tightening or loosening monetary policy. Thus, in this section we will look at the relative
volatility of exchange rates and interest rates as another indicator of the degree to which economic
authorities are willing to let the exchange rate float freely.
  As was the case with our previous indicator, if exchange rates are fixed or follow a crawling
peg with a constant rate of crawl, this indicator would be zero. Low values of this indicator would
suggest that exchange rates are very stable relative to interest rates. This could be due to attempts by
the monetary authorities to stabilize exchange rates using interest rates. Admittedly, interest rates could
be used for other purposes, namely output stabilization, but it would be hard to argue that the high
volatility of interest rates we see in most emerging countries could be due to this motive.
Some authors, such as Levi Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999), have suggested that, while wide
movements in interest rates may be an indication of heavily managed exchange rates, they are also
consistent with floating regimes coupled with inflation targets, particularly in countries in which the
exchange rate pass-through is high. While this “observational equivalence” may be a concern when
trying to classify countries into different regimes, it does not pose a problem here. We want to show
that different countries float in different ways. For our purposes, it is not important to know if there is
                                                       
8 In the case of Indonesia, we started 5 months after the regime shift in order to avoid a period of extreme instability.11
concern about exchange rates per se. What matters is whether authorities act “as if” that concern
existed.
In addition to these more conceptual points, examples abound of countries that have in fact used
interest rates actively in order to avoid the depreciation of the currency. The behavior of some
European countries before the 1992 collapse of the European Monetary System is a case in point. The
increase in Brazilian interest rates prior to the collapse of the Real is a recent Latin American example.
These considerations justify the focus on the behavior of interest rates as a variable of interest.
In order to compute the relative volatility of devaluations vis a vis interest rate, we used, when
available, money market interest rates from IFS. In cases in which these rates were unavailable, we
used data on money market rates from Bloomberg and, when these were unavailable or the series not
long enough, we replaced money market rates with lending or deposit rates from IFS.
 9  As was the case
with reserves, the index corresponds to the period January 1997-April 1999 (or until the latest month
available from IFS), except for those countries which abandoned fixed exchange rate regimes after
January 1997, in which case we started the period of measurement three months after the regime shift.
The relative volatility of devaluations vis a vis interest rate is presented in the third column of
Table 1.  As in the case of our other measures, there are very substantial differences across countries.
Japan is by far the country with the highest ratio. Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the volatility of
exchange rates in this country is not unusually high, but the volatility of interest rates is well below that
of all other countries. In the G-3 countries as a group, the ratio of volatilities is one order of magnitude
larger than in the case of emerging countries, while in other developed countries the ratio is more than
twice as large. Interestingly, the ratio is very low in most countries in Latin America, whether they are
classified as emerging or other developing. In fact, eight out of the ten countries with the lowest ratios
are from this region.
3. Why Do Countries Float the Way they Float?
In this section, we attempt to uncover some of the reasons for the difference in behavior among floaters
discussed in Section 2. We focus on two separate aspects: pass-through from exchange rates to prices
and extent of foreign currency liabilities.
Authorities may care about the exchange rate in countries in which the pass-through from
exchange rates to prices is large, and where inflation is an important consideration. The attention paid
to the exchange rate should be smaller in countries where the effects of exchange rate changes on
prices are small, or when the pass-through takes a long time to take effect. To study this hypothesis, we
develop a rough measure of the pass-through from exchange rates to prices for the countries in our
sample. We then use this measure to test whether the countries with high pass-through tend to intervene
more in the foreign exchange market, either through reserves or interest rates.
Authorities may also care about the exchange rate in countries in which there are large currency
mismatches in the balance sheets of firms, banks, households or the government. If these mismatches
are important, depreciations may generate widespread bankruptcies (if the currency mismatches are in
                                                       
9 Rather than working with annual interest rates, for the calculation of the volatility of interest rates we converted annual
rates into monthly rates. The reason is the following: if a country has, during the period under study, a downward trend in
inflation, this will translate into a downward trend in interest rates, as well as in monthly devaluation. By using the same
unit of time for the devaluation and the interest rates, we ensure that the effect of these trends due to changes in inflation on
both volatilities will be fairly symmetric, and will more or less cancel out when the relative volatilities are calculated. The
countries for which we did not have data on money market interest rates are: Chile, Greece, Guatemala, Jamaica, New
Zealand and the Philipines (for which we used deposit rates) and Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Israel, Paraguay, Peru
and Poland (for which we used lending rates).12
the private sector) or result in serious fiscal consequences (if the currency mismatches are in the public
sector) or both.
10 This may create incentives for policymakers to avoid large depreciations. In order to
capture the potential for currency mismatches, we will use a variable that captures the ability of
countries to borrow abroad in their own currency and test whether it has an effect on the degree of
exchange rate intervention. After considering each of these potential determinants separately, we end
the section by discussing their impact when they are both included in the analysis.
3.1 A Simple Model of the Behavior of the Central Bank
To set the stage for the empirical analysis, we develop a simple model of the behavior of a Central
Bank in response to shocks, in a context in which depreciation leads to inflation, and a portion of debt
is denominated in foreign currency. The formal model (based on Aghion et al., 1999) is derived in the
Appendix; here we discuss only the main building blocks of the model, as well as the  model’s
implications.
We assume that the Central Bank sets interest rates/exchange rates so as to minimize a standard
Barro-Gordon loss function, which depends on inflation and income. Interest rates and exchange rates
are linked through an interest parity condition. Thus, in response to an adverse shock, the Central Bank
will either increase domestic interest rates, devalue, or both. In a way, the choice variable of the Central
Bank is the policy mix between devaluation and increase in the interest rate.
Prices adjust to changes in the exchange rate, and the magnitude of the adjustment is given by
the degree of pass-through.  We assume a linear technology with capital as the only factor of
production. Thus, output is proportional to the stock of capital. This stock, which fully depreciates each
period, is equal to previous period profits (or net wealth), plus debt. We assume that a fixed proportion
of debt, k, is denominated in foreign currency. Furthermore, firms are credit constrained. They can only
borrow an amount proportional to their net wealth, and, following Aghion et al., the coefficient of
proportionality depends negatively on the interest rate.
How does the policy response “mix” of the central bank affect the policy objectives, inflation
and output?  A depreciation affects these objectives through three different channels. First,  a
depreciation directly affects the rate of inflation. The impact of depreciation on inflation will depend on
the level of the pass-through. Second, provided that  k>0, a depreciation affects output through a
balance sheet effect: the depreciation increases the cost of repayment of foreign currency denominated
debt, reducing profits in this period, and thus the capital stock and output in the second period. The size
of the balance sheet effect will depend on k, the share of debt denominated in foreign currency. Third,
a larger depreciation entails a smaller increase in interest rates. Thus, a larger depreciation increases
output in the second period, since the reduction in interest rates eases the credit constraint (we call this
the credit channel effect). The overall effect on income will depend on which of the two channels
dominates. If the credit channel dominates over the balance sheet channel,  depreciations are
expansionary. Otherwise, they are contractionary.
If k and pass-through are zero, only the credit channel remains, so the Central Bank will have
incentives to respond to a shock by devaluing without increasing interest rates. The larger k (and the
associated balance sheet effect), and the larger the rate of pass-through, the larger the incentives for the
Central Bank to minimize the movements of the exchange rate and instead respond to external shocks
by adjusting the domestic interest rate. An implication of this is that, if the degree of pass-through is
high and currency mismatches are important, the interest rate may be used to prevent depreciations,
                                                       
10 For a discussion of the consequences of devaluation adjustment in the case of foreign currency liabilities see Calvo
(1999a and b), Calvo and Reinhart (1999), Hausmann (1999a), Stein et al. (1999), and Fernández-Arias and Talvi (1999).13
imposing limitations on the ability of the Central Bank to use interest rates exclusively to smooth
cyclical fluctuations. Contrary to the standard result according to which nominal shocks require an
interest rate adjustment and real shocks an exchange rate adjustment, in our model both real and
nominal shocks may require interest rate and exchange rate adjustments. As is shown in the Appendix,
we find that, under both types of shocks, the relative size of the exchange rate/interest rate adjustment
will depend on the degree of pass-through and the share of foreign currency liabilities.
In order to test the implications of the model, in what follows we develop measures of exchange
rate pass-through and the ability of countries to avoid currency mismatches, and explore whether these
variables are associated with the left-hand side variables discussed in Section 2.
3.2  Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Exchange Rate Management of Floaters
Estimating the exchange rate to price pass-through for a cross-section of countries is not a simple
exercise. Ideally, one would want to model each country’s price-setting mechanism individually. This
would represent a major undertaking, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we follow here a
methodology used for Australia by de Brower and Ericsson (1995) and for Mexico by Garcés Diaz




Where  P are domestic prices,  W wages,  F  international prices in domestic currency (obtained by
multiplying the exchange rate with and index of international prices),
11 a is the mark up parameter, and
q, and g are the long-run elasticities of wages and external prices. By taking the logs of the above
equation it is possible to estimate the long-run relationship among wages, international prices, and local
prices. Since we do not have monthly data for wages, we estimate the following long-run equation:
p = log(a) + gf  , (2)
where lower-case letters represent the log of the variables defined above. While the omission of wages
may bias our estimates of pass-through, the bias is likely to affect the coefficients of all countries in the
same direction. Since our interest is to rank countries according to their pass-through, rather than the
actual level of the pass-through, the omission of wages should not be too much of a concern. Besides
data limitations, there are theoretical reasons for excluding wages from the above equation.  In
particular, if we included wages in Equation (2), the international price coefficient g would not fully
capture the impact that the exchange rate may have on prices through its effect on wages.  Therefore,
Equation (2) is an appropriate specification to estimate what we are interested in, i.e., the total effect of
the exchange rate on prices.  In any case, it is reassuring that the long run estimates we obtained for
Australia and Mexico are very similar to those obtained by de Brower and Ericsson, and by Garcés
Díaz.
12
All the series we use can be described as having a unit root process.  Hence, we need to study
the long-run relationship between internal and external prices using cointegration analysis. Controlling
                                                       
11 Most of the variation of F is due to exchange rate variation.
12 Our coefficient for Australia  (0.48) is identical to the one obtained by de Brower and Ericsson.  The coefficient for
Mexico (0.98) is different from the one obtained by Garcés Diaz (0.63) because we use different time periods (1990-99 in
this paper and 1985-98 in Garcés Diaz), When we estimate the equation for the 1985-1998 period we obtain a coefficient of
0.69, very close to the one obtained by Garcés Diaz.14
for the long-run cointegration relationship between exchange rates and prices, we capture the short-run
dynamics by estimating the following error correction model:
t t t t t t df p f p dp e l j a g f + + + + + = - - - - 1 1 1 1 ) ( (3)
We measure p using the log of the CPI.  For Germany, the UK, and the non-European countries, we
measure f by adding the log of the US dollar exchange rate to the log of an index of international
commodity prices (from International Financial Statistics).
13 For the rest of the European countries, we
measure f by adding the log of the DM exchange rate to the log of the German CPI. Table 2 reports the
results of the estimations of 12 months and long-run pass-through. The third column of Table 2 shows
the number of months required to complete 50 percent of the adjustment toward the new equilibrium.
This column shows that the speed of adjustment can differ greatly even for countries with similar levels
of pass-through. In Germany and Paraguay, for instance, a devaluation will have a similar long-run
effect on domestic prices, but the adjustment will be much more sluggish in Germany.
While both the long-run and the one-year measures of pass-through can be relevant, the long-
run coefficient loses importance if the adjustment is very slow. In Germany, for example, a change in
international prices will, in the long run, translate into an equivalent change in domestic prices.
However, the adjustment to the steady state requires more than 50 years. In contrast, Greece has a
relatively low long-run pass through (0.23) but a very fast adjustment. If we compare the two countries
we find that, for almost three years, a change in external prices has a stronger effect on Greek domestic
prices than on German prices. For this reason, in the empirical analysis below we use the one-year
pass-through as the relevant explanatory variable.
14
  Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the relationship between one-year pass-through and the three measures
of foreign exchange intervention discussed in Section 2.  Figure 1 shows a positive (but not statistically
significant) correlation between the level of reserves and pass-through. The correlation coefficient is
0.26. Notice that Singapore has both extremely high reserves and low pass-through. If we drop this
outlier, the correlation coefficient jumps to 0.52 and becomes highly significant. The figure suggests
that while countries with low pass-through may choose to have whatever levels of reserves they want,
countries with high pass-through find it necessary to build war chests of international reserves in order
to be able to defend their exchange rate.
 Figures 2 and 3 show instead a negative correlation between pass-through and the relative
volatility of exchange rate vis a vis reserves and interest rates. The correlation coefficients are –0.44
and –0.37, respectively, and are in both cases statistically significant. All in all, through this simple
univariate analysis, we find that exchange rate pass-through does have a role in explaining the degree
to which policymakers intervene in foreign exchange markets, a result that is consistent with the model
outlined in Section 3.1. As we will see in Section 3.4, however, the impact of pass-through becomes
more limited once we account for the role of foreign currency liabilities.
                                                       
13 For Canada, Mexico, India, and Peru, we use the log of the US CPI instead of the log of international prices. For the first
two countries this choice is due to the important economic links of Canada and Mexico with the USA.  In the case of India
and Peru, we could not use the index of international prices because the estimations did not converge.
14 However, we check that our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of pass-through which combine the short
and long run into a single indicator, or to the use of proxies such as the degree of openness.15








Australia 0.21 0.48 14
Canada 0.07 0.19 16
Colombia (1992-99) 0.38 1.58 30
Czech Republic 0.02 1.17 240
Dominican Republic 0.25 1.38 32
Germany 0.07 0.97 130
Greece 0.15 0.23 1
Guatemala 0.28 0.86 20
India 0.07 0.92 220
Indonesia 0.49 0.92 11
Israel 0.16 0.55 30
Jamaica 0.31 0.41 2
Japan 0.04 0.09 17
Korea 0.18 0.59 24
Mexico 0.58 0.93 10
Norway (1988-99) 0.09 0.32 26
Paraguay 0.59 0.98 10
Peru (1992-99) 0.22 0.43 12
Philippines 0.3 1.16 26
Poland 0.62 0.8 1
Singapore 0.02 0.16 50
South Africa 0.11 0.47 35
Sweden 0.14 0.22 8
Switzerland 0.02 0.02 1
Thailand 0.03 0.19 50
UK 0.03 0.06 12
USA* 0.04 0.34 56
*International prices versus US effective nominal rate
3.3  Currency Mismatches and Exchange Rate Management of Floaters
In order to test the importance of currency mismatches for exchange rate management, we develop a
set of indicators that measure the ability of countries to borrow internationally in their own currency.
We believe that the inability of countries to borrow in their own currency is a fundamental determinant
of the existence of currency mismatches in the country’s balance sheets, since it is this inability that
makes it more difficult for agents to hedge their currency risks. For this purpose, we rely on two
different databases from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). One of them records international
transactions involving the banking sector, while the other one reports international debt securities
transactions (including bonds and money market instruments).
Our first indicator of the ability of a country to borrow internationally in its own currency is
based on the international debt securities database, which contains data on debt instruments
disaggregated by nationality of issuer and by currency. Our index measures the ratio between the stock
of international debt securities issued by a country in its own currency and the total stock of securities16
issued by the country in all currencies. Table 3 presents the value of this indicator (which we call
ABILITY1) for all the countries in our sample. The figures correspond to the 1998-1999 average.
Notice that this ratio is 0 in almost half of the countries, and is very small (lower than 3 percent) in
more than two thirds of the cases. The bottom part of the table shows that there is a very high
correlation between this indicator and the level of development. In fact, South Africa is the only
developing country with a significant amount of debt securities denominated in its own currency.
Table 3: Ability to borrow in own currency
Ability1 Ability2 Ability3
AUSTRALIA 0.214 0.247 0.437
BRAZIL 0.000 0.051 0.000
CANADA 0.152 0.172 0.273
CHILE 0.000 0.029 0.000
COLOMBIA 0.000 0.000 0.000
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.000 0.244 0.000
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0.000 0.020 0.000
GERMANY 0.279 0.463 0.872
GREECE 0.028 0.154 0.245
GUATEMALA 0.000 0.004 0.000
INDIA 0.000 0.040 0.000
INDONESIA 0.010 0.054 0.000
ISRAEL 0.000 0.020 0.000
JAMAICA 0.000 0.011 0.000
JAPAN 0.513 0.492 1.522
KOREA (SOUTH) 0.000 0.011 0.000
MEXICO 0.001 0.011 0.000
NEW ZEALAND 0.041 0.144 1.048
NORWAY 0.006 0.125 0.053
PARAGUAY 0.000 0.000 0.000
PERU 0.000 0.046 0.000
PHILIPPINES 0.007 0.035 0.019
POLAND 0.022 0.151 0.324
SINGAPORE 0.007 0.030 0.000
SOUTH AFRICA 0.112 0.229 1.173
SWEDEN 0.021 0.208 0.076
SWITZERLAND 0.164 0.271 2.055
THAILAND 0.022 0.020 0.000
UNITED KINGDOM 0.467 0.191 0.943
UNITED STATES 0.782 0.796 2.325
REGIONAL AVERAGE
G3 0.52 0.58 1.57
OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED 0.12 0.17 0.57
EMERGING COUNTRIES 0.014 0.07 0.13
OTHER DEVELOPING 0 0.02 0
LAC EMERGING 0 0.03 0
EAST ASIA 0.01 0.03 0
ALL COUNTRIES 0.108 0.152 0.44317
A drawback of our first indicator is that it only captures one third of the total claims registered
by the  BIS. To address the limited coverage of this indicator, we compute a second indicator
(ABILITY2) using, together with the data on debt securities included in ABILITY1, BIS data on total
claims of the banking sector. Unfortunately, BIS does not provide the complete currency breakdown of
the claims of the banking sector. The data are only available for 10 currencies (six of which correspond
to countries in our sample) plus an “other currencies” category.
15 For the remaining 24 countries for
which we do not have information, all bank debt in “other currencies” was assumed to be denominated
in a country’s own currency. Thus, this indicator overestimates the ability of countries to borrow
abroad in own currency. Although we sacrifice precision, the gains in terms of coverage are important.
In fact, the debt considered represents on average more than 60 percent of the total foreign debt of the
countries in the sample. The value of ABILITY2 for each country, as well as the average for each
group of countries, is presented in the second column of Table 3.
Our third indicator relies, like the first, on the debt securities database. In this case, we compute
the ratio between the stock of foreign securities issued in a given currency (regardless of the nationality
of the issuer) and the amount of foreign securities issued by the corresponding country. The results are
presented in the third column of Table 3. Notice that several developed countries have values greater
than one. This indicates that other countries issue securities in those currencies. Not surprisingly, the
value corresponding to the United States is the largest. In fact, by comparing the values of our first and
third indicators, it is easy to see that about two thirds of the total stock of dollar debt instruments has
been issued by countries other than the United States. More surprising is the fact that South Africa has
a value greater than unity, suggesting that its currency is widely used by nationals of other countries.
Although this indicator may seem less precise than the other two, we think that it is a good
measure of the potential for foreign currency mismatches. The difficulty in hedging foreign currency
risk is the need to find agents willing to take the other side of the transaction. To hedge foreign
currency risk is equivalent to borrowing in own currency since, from the point of view of the borrower,
a debt in domestic currency is equivalent to a dollar debt plus a hedge. If a country is unable to borrow
in its own currency, then it will be unable to hedge its currency risk. However, if a non-resident is able
to borrow in this country’s currency (for example, South African Rand), then he may be able to swap
his Rand obligations for dollar obligations of a South African resident, thus providing the basis for a
hedge. This suggests that what is critical is the overall balance between total debt issued by a country,
and the total debt issued in its currency. If these amounts are balanced, then the swap market can
extinguish any remaining currency mismatches. Thus, by including in the numerator all debt securities
issued in the country’s currency, this indicator may be more appropriate than the others as a measure of
the potential problems that could arise due to currency mismatches. It is worth noting, in any case, that
the correlation between our three indices is extremely high, larger than 0.8 in all cases, so results are
not sensitive to the index used.
It could be argued that the effects of the ability to borrow abroad in own currency on the left-
hand side variables identified in Section 2 may be non-linear. The important difference may be whether
a country can or cannot borrow abroad in own currency; differences between countries such as
Germany and the United States may be less important. This suggests the use of a fourth indicator,
ABILITY4, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country can borrow abroad in own
                                                       
15 The currency breakdown is available for Belgian Francs, Swiss Francs, Deutsche Marks, ECUs, French Francs, British
Pounds, Italian Lira, Japanese Yen, Netherlands Guilders, and US Dollars. It is striking that these 10 currencies account for
94 percent of the total international bank transactions around the world, a clear indication of the limited use of “other
currencies” in these transactions. Even if we excluded the countries that issue these currencies, debts denominated in  “other
currencies” only account for 9 percent of the total international bank debt of other countries.18
currency and 0 otherwise. We built this variable by assigning a value of 1 to countries for which our
ABILITY1 index was greater than 0.1.
 16
Figures 4, 5 and 6 present the relationship between our second index and the three measures
discussed in Section 2: the level of reserves, the relative volatility of exchange rates and reserves, and
the relative volatility of exchange rates and interest rates. Figure 4 shows a very strong negative
association between the ability of a country to borrow in its own currency and the stock of international
reserves. The correlation between the two variables is –0.5, and it is significant at the 1 percent level.
The figure suggests that countries that are unable to borrow in their own currency find it necessary to
keep large stocks of reserves in order to defend their currency.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the ability to borrow in domestic currency and the
relative volatility of exchange rates and reserves. The relationship is positive and quite strong. The
correlation is 0.6, and significant at the 1 percent level. Results are fairly similar when we consider
intervention using interest rates instead of reserves (Figure 18). In this case, the correlation is 0.7, and
highly significant.
In sum, our results suggest that the ability to borrow in domestic currency is an important
determinant of the degree to which policymakers are able to show what has been called “benign
neglect” regarding the behavior of the exchange rate. Central Banks of countries unable to borrow in
their own currencies will internalize the potential negative impact of a depreciation due to currency
mismatches when carrying out exchange rate and monetary policy.
3.4  The Impact of Pass-Through and Foreign Currency Mismatches on Exchange Rate Management.
The previous sections focused on the role of the exchange rate pass-through and that of foreign
currency liabilities when considered independently. Here we bring them together into the analysis of
the differences in behavior among floaters. We run a large set of regressions where we explain the level
of reserves, as well as the relative volatility of exchange rates vis a vis reserves and interest rates using
as explanatory variables the degree of exchange rate pass-through and our indices of a country’s ability
to borrow in own currency. In addition to these, we consider two other explanatory variables. First, in
order to check whether our results are driven by the level of economic development, we augment the
regressions with a measure of GDP per capita.
17 Second, to control for the fact that countries may need
time to “learn” how to operate under a flexible exchange rate, we include in our regressions a measure
of the number of months since the country started floating (in logs). By using our four different indices
of the ability to borrow in own currencies and the set of explanatory variables described above, we
obtain 16 different specifications for each of our three dependent variables. The results of the
regressions are reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
Table 4 presents the results of the regressions for the level of international reserves. We find
that the ability to borrow in own currency is negatively associated with the level of reserves and highly
significant in every one of the regressions. The effect is quite substantial. In the regressions using our
first index, for example, a one standard deviation increase in the ability to borrow in own currency is
associated with a 10 percentage point decrease in international reserves. We find that the exchange rate
pass-through coefficient almost always has a positive (but not statistically significant) sign. Our control
variables, GDP per capita and “experience” in floating do not play any role in explaining the level of
reserves.
                                                       
16 Results reported in the next section are robust to different definitions of this dummy.
17 Alternatively, we also tried an industrialized country dummy, which produced similar results.19
Tables 5 and 6 show the ability to borrow in own currency is strongly associated with the relative
volatility of devaluation vis a vis reserves and interest rates.
18 The results are extremely robust: the
coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all regressions, significant at a 5 percent
confidence level in 30 out of 32 regressions, and at a 1 percent confidence level in 22 out of 32
regressions. In the regression using our first index a one standard deviation increase in the ability to
borrow in own currency is associated with an increase in the volatility of devaluation vis a vis reserves
of 1 (which corresponds to about three quarters of one standard deviation of the relative volatility of
devaluations vis a vis reserves) and to an increase in the volatility of devaluation vis a vis interest rate
of 0.55 (which corresponds to about half of one standard deviation of the relative volatility of
devaluations vis a vis interest rate). The coefficient attached to pass-through has in most cases the
expected negative sign but is rarely significant. If anything, pass-through has a marginal effect on the
relative volatility of exchange rate vis a vis international reserves. Income per capita does not play any
role in explaining the relative volatility of  devaluations and international reserves but it is often
positively correlated with the relative volatility of devaluations and interest rate.  Finally, the number of
months since the country has started floating does not seem to play any role in explaining the relative
volatility of devaluations.
We also ran a series of robustness tests, using two other definitions of ability to borrow in own
currency (total loans and total claims), different measures of pass-through (long-run pass-through, a
weighted average of long and short-run pass-through in which the weight of the long-run measure
depends on the speed of adjustment, an alternative measure of pass-through computed using an OLS
regression of changes in prices over changes in exchange rate, and openness as a proxy of pass-
through), and dummies to capture the non-linearities in the behavior of G3 countries.  In order to check
whether our results are driven by outliers, we also re-ran all our regressions using a robust estimator,
and we did not find any significant difference with respect to the results illustrated in Tables 4 through
6.
19 The only significant change is that, when we control for  outliers, pass-through becomes a
significant factor in explaining the level of international reserves.
The results of Tables 4 through 6 are surprisingly strong: we ran a very large set of regressions
and we found that ability to borrow in own currency is always highly correlated with our measures of
how countries float.  To make sure that our results were not driven by mistakes or arbitrariness in our
definition of how countries float, we now use, as a dependent variable, the de facto classification of
exchange rate regimes computed by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999). These authors observe that
not all countries float (or fix) in the same way.  Some officially floating countries have levels of
intervention in the foreign exchange market that make them indistinguishable from countries with a
fixed exchange rate.  In order to differentiate “Deeds vs Words,” Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999)
use cluster analysis to classify countries into four different groups (Flexible, Dirty Float, Crawling Peg,
Fixed) independent of the official regime stated by the country that is assigned to the group.
For 27 countries, our sample overlaps with Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s sample.  We use
their data for 1997 and generate a new index (LY&S) that takes a value of 1 for countries that are
classified as having a floating exchange rate, 2 for countries that are classified as dirty float, 3 for
crawling pegs, and 4 for countries classified as fixed (the data are reported in the last column of Table
A2).  The index is hence inversely correlated to a country’s willingness to float its exchange rate. As
expected, we find that LY&S is positively correlated with the average level of international reserves
                                                       
18 In the regressions we use the log of the volatility of devaluation.  The results are robust to using the levels.
19 The estimator used is the one suggested by STATA. The results of the robust estimations, as well as the details of the
estimation procedure, are available upon request.20
and negatively correlated with intervention in foreign markets. We were, however, somewhat surprised
to find that these correlations were not statistically significant.
As the  LY&S index provides a discrete measure, rather than a continuous one, of the
willingness to float, the appropriate method to study its correlation with pass-through and the ability to
borrow in own currency would be an ordered probit model. Unfortunately, this methodology requires a
rather large sample and it is not appropriate for our small sample of 27 countries.  To gain some
insight, we study the correlation between the LY&S index, pass-through and the ability to borrow in
own currency using OLS. The results are reported in Table 7. As before, we find that the ability to
borrow in own currency is positively and significantly correlated with the willingness to float.
Surprisingly, we also find that the degree of pass-through is positively correlated to the willingness to
float index, although this relationship is never statistically significant.
4.  Conclusions
There are significant differences in the behavior of countries that have adopted floating exchange rate
systems (or very wide bands). We document these differences by showing that these countries hold
very different levels of reserves and allow very different degrees of flexibility of the exchange rate
relative to the volatility of their reserves or of the interest rate. In general, G-3 countries float with a
very low level of reserves and with a high volatility of the exchange rate relative to that of the level of
reserves or of the interest rate. Emerging countries are at the opposite extreme, while other industrial
countries are in an intermediate position.
We present a model that interprets these differences as the optimal response of a Central Bank
that minimizes a loss function in inflation and output in a context in which firms are subject to credit
constraints and currency mismatches. The model focuses on the fact that countries differ in their ability
to deal with the currency mismatch problem and have different levels of pass-through from exchange
rates to prices.  The model finds that, in countries with large currency mismatches and high levels of
exchange rate pass-through, the Central Bank will be more concerned about the level of the exchange
rate and hence limit exchange rate volatility.
We explore the implications of the model in a sample of developing and industrial countries
with floating regimes (or wide bands). We find a very strong and robust relationship between the
ability of a country to borrow internationally in its own currency and the way it manages its exchange
rate system. In particular, we conclude that floating rate countries that do not borrow internationally in
their own currency tend to hold significantly larger reserve levels and allow much less volatility in the
exchange rate relative to their interventions with international reserves and interest rate. We find
weaker and less robust results with respect to the effects of pass-through.21
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Table 4: Average level of international reserves














Ability1 -0.507 *** 0.060 0.28 27
(0.179) (0.212)
 Ability1 -0.585 ** 0.139 0.030 0.31 27
(0.245) (0.154) (0.035)
 Ability1 -0.567 * 0.117 0.031 -0.010 0.31 27
(0.278) (0.125) (0.035) (0.022)
 Ability1 -0.555 ** 0.016 -0.011 0.27 30
(0.251) (0.035) (0.022)
 Ability2 -0.477 ** 0.063 0.24 27
(0.208) (0.247)
 Ability2 -0.572 * 0.136 0.031 0.26 27
(0.293) (0.193) (0.038)
 Ability2 -0.548 0.097 0.033 -0.017 0.27 27
(0.324) (0.168) (0.037) (0.021)
 Ability2 -0.563 * 0.022 -0.016 0.25 30
(0.292) (0.0380 (0.022)
Ability3 -0.143 *** 0.068 0.26 27
(0.053) (0.225)
 Ability3 -0.162 ** 0.138 0.026 0.28 27
(0.069) (0.171) (0.035)
 Ability3 -0.156 * 0.113 0.027 -0.011 0.29 27
(0.080) (0.142) (0.034) (0.022)
 Ability3 -0.172 ** 0.020 -0.009 0.30 30
(0.074) (0.036) (0.024)
Ability4 -0.270 *** -0.033 0.39 27
(0.078) (0.222)
 Ability4 -0.318 *** 0.068 0.042 0.44 27
(0.108) (0.151) (0.036)
 Ability4 -0.326 ** 0.082 0.042 0.007 0.44 27
(0.129) (0.130) (0.036) (0.028)
 Ability4 -0.298 ** 0.025 0.003 0.37 30
(0.114) (0.036) (0.026)24
Table 5:  Depreciations and volatility of international reserves














 Ability1 4.900 *** -0.955 0.67 27
(0.993) (0.780)
 Ability1 5.447 *** -1.508 * -0.212 0.70 27
(1.138) (0.805) (0.134)
 Ability1 5.653 *** -1.765 * -0.203 -0.114 0.71 27
(1.237) (0.877) (0.129) (0.108)
Ability1 5.415 *** -0.018 -0.078 0.55 30
(1.270) (0.140) (0.1120)
Ability2 3.775 *** -1.353 0.45 27
(0.941) (1.062)
 Ability2 4.219 *** -1.694 -0.145 0.46 27
(0.984) (1.085) (0.166)
 Ability2 4.236 *** -1.722 -0.144 -0.012 0.46 27
(1.034) (1.229) (0.166) (0.135)
 Ability2 4.317 *** 0.013 0.001 0.37 30
(1.031) (0.160) (0.124)
Ability3 1.071 *** -1.479 0.46 27
(0.355) (0.890)
 Ability3 1.143 *** -1.742 * -0.099 0.47 27
(0.366) (0.923) (0.158)
 Ability3 1.170 *** -1.859 * -0.095 -0.052 0.47 27
(0.394) (1.027) (0.158) (0.118)
 Ability3 1.323 *** 0.026 -0.053 0.43 30
(0.388) (0.138) (0.122)
Ability4 1.859 *** -0.909 0.57 27
(0.443) (0.859)
 Ability4 2.071 *** -1.345 -0.183 0.59 27
(0.471) (0.869) (0.151)
 Ability4 2.254 *** -1.676 * -0.179 -0.168 0.61 27
(0.489) (0.923) (0.147) (0.124)
 Ability4 2.014 *** 0.026 -0.110 0.44 30
(0.582) (0.170) (0.127)25
Table 6:  Depreciations and exchange rate volatility














Ability1 3.379 ** -0.698 0.46 27
(1.269) (0.630)
 Ability1 2.598 ** 0.091 0.302 ** 0.55 27
(1.189) (0.672) (0.143)
 Ability1 2.523 * 0.185 0.299 * 0.042 0.55 27
(1.238) (0.710) (0.151) (0.087)
 Ability1 2.604 ** 0.283 * 0.039 0.55 30
(1.193) (0.140) (0.075)
Ability2 3.822 *** -0.433 0.50 27
(1.410) (0.646)
 Ability2 3.009 ** 0.192 0.266 * 0.57 27
(1.330) (0.711) (0.145)
 Ability2 2.920 ** 0.339 0.259 0.064 0.57 27
(1.367) (0.767) (0.154) (0.085)
 Ability2 3.005 ** 0.232 0.051 0.57 30
(1.324) (0.144) (0.074)
 Ability3 0.864 *** -0.879 0.38 27
(0.307) (0.616)
 Ability3 0.584 * 0.166 0.335 ** 0.062 0.50 27
(0.298) (0.725) (0.153) (0.088)
 Ability3 0.616 ** 0.026 0.341 ** 0.49 27
(0.283) (0.669) (0.145)
Ability3 0.577 ** 0.317 ** 0.059 0.49 30
(0.271) (0.144) (0.075)
Ability4 1.446 *** -0.481 0.46 27
(0.400) (0.642)
 Ability4 1.099 *** 0.231 0.298 ** 0.54 27
(0.362) (0.648) (0.142)
 Ability4 1.090 *** 0.247 0.298 * 0.008 0.54 27
(0.392) (0.672) (0.147) (0.098)
 Ability4 1.102 *** 0.284 ** 0.008 0.54 30
(0.364) (0.139) (0.081)26
Table 7:  True Versus False Floaters














Ability1 -2.278 ** -1.095 0.18 24
(0.924) (1.122)
 Ability1 -2.755 ** -0.728 0.164 0.21 24
(1.211) (1.104) (0.196)
 Ability1 -2.713 ** -0.781 0.164 -0.020 0.21 24
(1.297) (1.199) (0.199) (0.167)
 Ability1 -2.931 ** 0.284 -0.029 0.22 27
(1.236) (0.184) (0.152)
Ability2 -1.960 ** -0.897 0.12 24
(0.817) (1.072)
 Ability2 -2.635 * -0.551 0.183 0.15 24
(1.283) (1.044) (0.211)
 Ability2 -2.565 * -0.624 0.181 -0.028 0.16 24
(1.384) (1.139) (0.215) (0.183)
 Ability2 -2.693 ** 0.291 -0.048 0.15 27
(1.306) (0.203) (0.165)
Ability3 -0.723 *** -1.208 0.21 24
(0.255) (1.081)
 Ability3 -0.863 ** -0.830 0.168 0.24 24
(0.314) (1.045) (0.189)
 Ability3 -0.854 ** -0.871 0.168 -0.016 0.24 24
(0.340) (1.130) (0.192) (0.168)
 Ability3 -0.641 * 0.241 -0.055 0.13 27
(0.317) (0.176) (0.159)
Ability4 -1.412 *** -1.896 0.35 24
(0.396) (1.143)
 Ability4 -1.793 *** -1.410 0.273 0.43 24
(0.446) (1.071) (0.178)
 Ability4 -1.942 *** -1.178 0.283 0.112 0.45 24
(0.492) (1.152) (0.190) (0.122)
 Ability4 -1.925 *** 0.397 ** 0.098 0.41 27
(0.477) (0.169) (0.133)27
Appendix
Exchange rate or interest rate adjustment: A simple model
In this Appendix, we follow Aghion et al. (2000) and Bacchetta (2000) and present a simple model
studying how the structure of the economy affects the Central Bank’s response to external shocks. In
particular, we look at the choice between adjusting the interest rate and the exchange rate and show that
pass-through and the presence of dollar-denominated liabilities are relevant for this choice.  We show
that in countries with high pass-through and high dollarization the Central Bank is more likely to use
the interest rate and that in countries with low pass-through and low dollarization the Central Bank is
more likely to use the exchange rate.  We start by describing the basic structure of the economy and the
preferences of the Central Bank, and then we discuss what is the Central Bank’s optimal reaction to
real and nominal shocks.
Production
We assume a linear technology of the kind  Yt=stKt.  Capital stock fully depreciates and, at the
beginning of period t, capital is equal to net wealth Wt plus debt Dt (hence, Kt =Wt +Dt). As in Aghion
et al. (2000), we assume that, because of credit constraints, entrepreneurs can only borrow an amount
mWt proportional to their net wealth. Aghion et al. (1999) use moral hazard considerations to formally
derive m and show that this credit multiplier has an inverse relationship with the interest rate of the
previous period.  In particular, we can write total debt in period t as: Dt= m(it-1)Wt, with m’<0, and
m’’>0.  (Aghion et al., 1999, use the real interest rate; we follow Bacchetta, 2000, and use the nominal
interest rate)
We also assume that firms are not able to raise all the capital they need in domestic currency
and that a fraction k of their debt is in foreign currency. While Aghion et al. (2000) endogenize k, we
will assume that the ability to borrow in domestic currency is exogenous and that it is related to what
Hausmann (1999) calls the original sin of emerging markets.  We can then write production as a
function of current wealth:
t t t t W i Y )) ( 1 ( 1 - + = m s (A1)
If no profits are distributed, current wealth is equal to the real value of profits in the previous period.
Or, Wt+1= Pt/Pt.  Since capital is the only factor of production, profits are given by the value of the
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Where it-1 is the interest rate in period t-1 (we would obtain exactly the same results by using it instead
of it-1), paid on domestic currency debt, 1- k is the share of domestic currency debt, i* is the interest
rate paid on foreign currency debt, and k the share of debt in foreign currency. By setting St(it-1) = s(1-
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Prices and interest rate
We assume that in equilibrium purchasing power parity (PPP) holds, but prices are sticky and are a
function of changes of the exchange rate in the previous period.  Following a devaluation in period t-1,
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where  et is the exchange rate in period t and g captures the pass-through (Ball, 1998, provides a
justification for an equation similar to A4).   We also assume that arbitrage between investors yields the
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Preference of the Central Bank
The Central Bank sets the interest rate (and, through the interest rate parity condition of Equation A5,










pt is inflation at time t (we assume that target inflation is zero) and Y
c is target income.  We assume that
there is no inflation bias.
20 Hence, if there are no shocks, the loss function (A6) will be minimized for
it = i
* and et=et-1.
Let us now study how the Central Bank reacts to shocks.  We consider two kinds of shocks.
The first is a real shock (xt) that reduces the marginal productivity of capital. In particular we can
include the shock into Equation (A1) and obtain:
( ) t t t t t W i Y )) ( 1 ( 1 - + - = m x s   (A7)
The nominal shock (et) affects instead the Uncovered interest rate parity condition:
                                                       
20 This is equivalent to saying that Y
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There are several interpretations for Equation (A8). Aghion et al. (2000) think of et as an increase in
country risk or an increase in expected devaluation (that would jump away from 0).  An alternative
interpretation is an increase in the foreign interest rate.  For the purpose of our model, all these
interpretations are observationally equivalent.  Let us now describe the timing of events.
At the beginning of period 1, prices P1=P0=e0 =1 are preset and firms invest. Domestic debts
are contracted at the domestic rate i0 (because this is the best forecast of i1).  Foreign currency debt is
contracted at the foreign interest rate i
*. After investment decisions are made and debt contracts are
signed, an unanticipated shock occurs. The shock can be either real x or nominal e (or both).  After the
shock is realized, the Central Bank implements a monetary adjustment and sets the interest rate i1.   The
market responds by setting the exchange rate e1.
Figure 1 plots the composition of the demand and supply of funds and describes the adjustment
process.  On the horizontal axis we have the share of domestic debt and on the vertical axis the
domestic interest rate.  As, we assume that the composition of supply of funds is exogenous, the supply
curve can be represented by a vertical line crossing the horizontal axis at (1-k
*).  The relative demand
for domestic funds depends negatively on the domestic interest rate and positively on the foreign
interest rate and expected devaluation.
Let us suppose that markets are in equilibrium at the initial foreign and domestic interest rate i*
and that expected devaluation is zero (i.e., E(e2/e1)=1).   Now, suppose that there is an external shock.
The foreign interest rate increases to i** and the demand of funds jumps to D’. At the going domestic
interest rate, there is now an excess demand for domestic funds.  This excess demand will exert
pressure for an increase in domestic interest rate.  If the Central Bank decides that the domestic interest
rate should stay unchanged, the market will clear by making the exchange rate jump to a higher level
(e’1).  If g is less than one, the devaluation will generate an expected appreciation (i.e., E(e’2/e’1)<1)
and allow to keep the domestic interest rate at i*.   Alternatively, the Central Bank may decide to leave
the exchange rate untouched and let the interest rate move to its new level i**.  Obviously, the Central
Bank may choose any level of the interest rate (even below i
* or above i
**) and the market will respond
with a corresponding jump in e1.
After i1 and e1 have been set, profits for period 1 are realized, debt for period 2 is contracted,
and output for period 2 is determined.  Notice that, within the framework of Equation (A3), the
exchange rate directly affects output through its effect on profits (this effect would be zero if there were
no dollar-denominated liabilities or if pass-through were complete) and indirectly through the effect of
interest rate on the credit multiplier.  The first is the balance sheet channel and the second is the credit
channel.
21  We assume that at the end of period 2, the economy is back in equilibrium and, since PPP is
restored, e2 is equal to P2.
                                                       
21 Notice that, in the model discussed in this Appendix, the exchange rate does not affect income through a competitiveness
effect. By including competitiveness in Equation (A1), we would find that exchange rate affects output through three
channels (credit channel, balance sheet channel, and competitiveness channel) but this would not change the results
discussed below.30
The Optimal Response of the Central Bank
To study the optimal reaction of the Central Bank let us substitute Equations (A3), (A4), (A7), and
(A8) into the Central Bank’s loss function A6 and write the Central Bank’s problem as:
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Notice that, as e1 and i1 are linked by Equation (A7), the two instruments are equivalent and we can
express Equation (A9) as a function of either instrument.  We choose e1 because this simplifies the
algebra.  We can now minimize Equation (A9) with respect to e1 and obtain the following first order
condition:
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The first term of Equation A10 is the effect of the devaluation on inflation.  The second and third terms
are the effects of devaluation on output.  To better understand the last two terms of Equation (A10) let
us write  ( )
c c Y D e e i Y Y Y - = - 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 , , , , , ), ( k e x g .  Then, the second and third terms of Equation (A10)


























i c l .  As,  ( )( ) 0 1 1 2 > ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ e i i Y i  and  0 1 2 < ¶ ¶ e Y , the
sign of  ( )( ) ( ) [ ] 1 2 1 1 2 e Y e i i Y i ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶  is uncertain.  The first term captures the credit channel; the
second term, the balance sheet channel.  If the credit channel dominates the balance sheet channel,
devaluation are expansionary.  In this case the Central Bank will react to a shock by devaluing the
exchange rate, but, as devaluations have a cost in terms of inflation, the Central Bank cannot go all the
way and leave the interest rate untouched (that is devaluation will not compensate totally the shock x or
e).  Hence, the Central Bank will both devalue and increase the interest rate.
22
It is clear that the relative use of the two instruments depends on the size of ( )( )+ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ 1 1 2 e i i Y i
( ) 1 2 e Y ¶ ¶ . If this is large, the exchange rate will move more than the interest rate, but as
( )( )+ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ 1 1 2 e i i Y i ( ) 1 2 e Y ¶ ¶  goes to zero, interest rate adjustments will dominate exchange rate
adjustments.
23
Notice that if  ( )( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 2 1 1 2 < ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ e Y e i i Y i  devaluations are contractionary and hence the
Central Bank will respond to a negative shock with a restrictive monetary policy that will lead to a high
level of the interest rate (above i**) and to an appreciation of the exchange rate.
                                                       
22 The interest rate would be untouched only in the case in which g=0 (i.e., if there is no pass-through). At the same time,
the exchange rate would be untouched if g=1.
23 If  ( )( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 2 1 1 2 = ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ e Y e i i Y i , the whole shock will be absorbed by the interest rate.31
Concluding, the relative volatility of the interest rate and the exchange rate will depend on the
magnitude of 
( )








































Y i  and hence on the degree of pass-
through (g), the degree of liability dollarization (k), the effect of interest rate on the credit multipliers
(S’), and on the magnitude of the shocks.
Notice that, contrary to the standard result according to which  nominal shocks require an
interest rate adjustment and real shocks an exchange rate adjustment, we find that both real and
nominal shocks may require interest rate and exchange rate adjustments.  The relative size of the
adjustment will depend on pass-through and liability dollarization.  In particular, countries with high
pass-through and high levels of dollar liabilities will tend to adjust the interest rate more than the
exchange rate, no matter what kind of shock they are facing.
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Dynamics
The above discussion is based on the assumption that the Central Bank is only concerned with inflation
and output in period 2.  However, in our model, shocks are persistent.  Production in period 3 depends
both directly and indirectly (through production in period 2) on i1 and e1 and production in period t>3
will indirectly depend on  i1 and  e1 though production in period  t-1.  As this paper is essentially
empirical, the model provided in this Appendix is only meant to give a heuristic interpretation of what
we find in the empirical analysis.  Therefore, we will not attempt to solve for the dynamics of the
model.  In what follows we only look at what are the conditions under which the results derived in the
previous section are robust to an intertemporal specification of the model.32
With persistent shocks the one period loss function described in Equation (A6) is not appropriate. We





























, where r is the Central Bank’s rate of time preference.  By minimizing (A11) with
respect to e1 and doing some algebra, we obtain:
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Where P2 are profits in period 2 and  A=[s+m(s-(1+I*))].  Notice that the first two terms of Equation
(A12) are identical to Equation (A10).  The difference between the one-period loss function of
Equation (A6) and the intertemporal loss function of Equation (A11) is captured by the third term of
Equation (A12).
The key issue in solving the above first order condition is to decide what is the target income Y
c.
If, after the shock, the Central Bank readjusts its target income and, for t>2, makes it conditional to the
realization of Y2 we obtain the result that, for t>2, Yt= Y
c and Equation (A12) reduces to Equation
(A10).   If the Central Bank never readjusts its target, Yt- Y
c =h (where h is a constant), no clear
predictions can be made without assumptions on the parameters of the model and on the functional
form of m.33
Table 1A: Absolute and relative volatilities, and country rankings
Country (1) Std. Dev. Ranking (2) Std. Dev. Ranking (3) Std. Dev. Ranking (1)/(2) Ranking (1)/(3) Ranking
Australia 0.030 12 0.0043 26 0.0003 25 6.91 5 90.21 3
Brazil 0.067 3 0.0231 16 0.0056 3 2.92 8 12.13 24
Canada 0.017 24 0.0050 24 0.0007 22 3.37 7 23.46 12
Chile 0.015 26 0.0357 8 0.0019 11 0.42 25 7.96 27
Colombia 0.029 13 0.0317 11 0.0035 7 0.93 19 8.48 26
Czech 0.034 8 0.0269 14 0.0024 8 1.26 16 13.97 20
Dominican Rep. 0.024 18 0.0152 19 0.0021 9 1.58 14 11.57 25
Germany 0.027 14 0.0095 23 0.0002 29 2.84 9 157.91 2
Greece 0.023 19 0.0587 3 0.0009 21 0.39 28 25.02 9
Guatemala 0.013 28 0.0320 10 0.0005 24 0.42 26 24.94 10
India 0.015 27 0.0124 22 0.0041 6 1.21 17 3.70 29
Indonesia 0.194 1 0.0899 1 0.0083 1 2.15 13 23.38 13
Israel 0.026 16 0.0342 9 0.0012 19 0.76 21 21.38 15
Jamaica 0.005 30 0.0200 17 0.0020 10 0.27 30 2.75 30
Japan 0.044 6 0.0014 28 0.0001 30 30.45 1 377.26 1
Korea 0.064 4 0.0477 5 0.0045 4 1.35 15 14.14 19
Mexico 0.030 11 0.0358 7 0.0043 5 0.84 20 6.99 28
New Zealand 0.033 9 0.0026 27 0.0014 18 12.68 4 23.78 11
Norway 0.019 21 0.0537 4 0.0016 14 0.36 29 12.34 23
Paraguay 0.019 20 0.0316 12 0.0016 15 0.62 23 12.38 22
Peru 0.016 25 0.0315 13 0.0012 20 0.51 24 13.13 21
Philippines 0.054 5 0.0234 15 0.0014 17 2.32 11 38.50 8
Poland 0.026 15 0.0630 2 0.0018 12 0.42 27 14.58 18
Singapore 0.030 10 0.0437 6 0.0015 16 0.69 22 20.00 16
South Africa 0.036 7 0.0147 20 0.0016 13 2.47 10 22.80 14
Sweden 0.019 22 0.0196 18 0.0003 26 0.98 18 62.59 5
Switzerland 0.011 29 0.0049 25 0.0003 27 2.27 12 40.43 7
Thailand 0.087 2 0.0132 21 0.0058 2 6.62 6 15.16 17
United Kingdom 0.025 17 0.0014 29 0.0005 23 17.95 3 46.54 6
United States 0.018 23 0.0009 30 0.0003 28 19.38 2 69.63 4
Rel. Volatilities ER/IR Devaluation Reserves Interest Rate Rel. Volatilities ER/Res34







CZECH REPUBLIC 26 NA









KOREA (SOUTH) 237 NA
MEXICO 56 1











UNITED KINGDOM 330 1
UNITED STATES 359 1
REGIONAL AVERAGE
G3 310 1.0
OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED 197 2.1
EMERGING COUNTRIES 109 1.7
OTHER DEVELOPING 129 1.6
LAC EMERGING 52 1.8
EAST ASIA 157 1.2
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